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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In the past 20 years, Chile and Venezuela have followed 
divergent paths of democratic and economic development. 
When the Cold War ended, Venezuela was one of the few 
Latin American countries where democracy had survived the 
authoritarian wave of the 1960s and 1970s. Heralded in the 
late 1980s as the most stable democracy and one of the most 
developed and globalized economies in the region, 
Venezuela has since experienced deterioration of democratic 
institutions, political polarization, economic stagnation, and 
instability. In contrast, Chile has experienced a democratic 
renaissance since 1990. Rapid economic growth, an 
increasingly efficient public sector, significant reductions in 
poverty, and improvements in social programs have all made 
Chile a regional leader in democratic consolidation and 
sustainable development. Chile emerges as a success story 
and Venezuela as a country lagging behind in terms of 
making progress in economic development and poverty 
reduction. While Chile has developed a democratic system 
based on institutions, Venezuela has seen its democracy 
evolve towards increasing concentration on power on the 
hands of President Hugo Chávez.  
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CHILE: FROM A NATION OF ENEMIES TO A SOCIETY 
OF CITIZENS 
 
Chilean democracy has grown beyond what General Augusto 
Pinochet had in mind when the 1980 Constitution was 
drafted. Democracy today is more consolidated and inclusive 
than in the past. Yet, the 1973 coup and the Pinochet 
dictatorship remain defining moments since democracy is 
built on the foundations set in place by the 1980 
Constitution. Although amended several times, the 
Constitution reminds us that Pinochet is the father of today‘s 
Chile, and the Concertación coalition has been a deserving 
stepfather, helping heal deep social and political wounds and 
presiding over a successful period of economic growth, 
social inclusion, and democratic progress.
1
 The election of 
Salvador Allende (1970), who promised a ―Chilean road to 
socialism,‖ reflected the fact that the old democratic system 
was not functioning well.   
 
From 1960-1970, Chile‘s economic growth averaged 4.1 
percent (1.7 percent per capita). Inflation averaged 27 
percent in the 1960s. Chile was a profoundly unequal society 
in 1967:  the poorest 20 percent received 3.7 percent of 
national income whereas the richest 20 percent received 56.5 
percent (Navia 2010). The dictatorship dramatically 
transformed the country after 1973, and the economic model 
put in place remains the basis of economic policies.  The 
constitutional order designed to keep the military in power 
also provided space for democracy. After an economic crisis 
in 1982 forced the government to accommodate the 
opposition, and protests threatened the regime, political 
                                                 
1
 The Concertación has been one of the longest-lasting and most 
successful coalitions in Latin American history. The success of the 
Concertación, which governed Chile since its return to democracy in 
1990, was due to its ability to devise a formula for governing based on 
consensus among the disparate collection of center-left political parties 
that opposed the military government of Augusto Pinochet. Read more: 
http://americasquarterly.org/node/1490 
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parties seized the opportunity provided for in the constitution 
and forced a plebiscite. On 5 October 1988, Chileans voted 
for democracy. Democratic elections were held in March 
1990. 
  
Chile performed below the regional average in the years 
before 1984, but the following 26 years have seen Chile 
outperform its neighbors. Starting in 1984, the economy 
began to expand robustly. Under the administrations of 
Aylwin (1990–1994), Eduardo Frei (1994–2000), Ricardo 
Lagos (2000–2006), and Michelle Bachelet (2006–2010), 
Chile experienced its longest run of economic growth and 
poverty reduction. As such, economic growth has 
strengthened democracy, resulting in better living conditions, 
less poverty, more social and political inclusion, growing 
levels of participation, and the protection of civil and 
political liberties.  
 
 
Rapid economic growth experienced under Aylwin (7.8 
percent annual average) and earmarked social programs 
helped reduced poverty dramatically from 38.6 percent in 
1990 to 27.6 percent in 1994. Yet, Chile has obtained better 
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results in reducing poverty than in fighting inequality.  It has 
successfully combined a market-friendly economic model 
with a strong emphasis on poverty-alleviating programs. 
Poverty has decreased in every administration since 1990 
and inequality has also begun to decrease, as the Gini 
coefficient reached 0.54 in 2006 (Navia 2011). 
 
Table 1. Poverty and Extreme Poverty in Chile, 1990–2006 
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Chileans are satisfied with democracy. Latinobarómetro 
showed that 54 percent considered democracy the only 
legitimate form of government (1996). Although there have 
been fluctuations, in 2006 the figure was 56 percent and 46 
percent in 2007. Support for authoritarian government has 
stayed below 15 percent. Thus, temporary dissatisfaction 
with democracy has not increased support for alternative 
types of government (Latinobarómetro 2007, 2008). 
Satisfaction with democracy results from progress made in 
economic development and in civil and political rights 
(UNDP 2005).  Chile has experienced significant progress in 
protection of civil and political rights since 1990.  Although 
Chile had more restrictions than average in the region during 
the dictatorship, in the democratic period it scored better 
than the region overall, reached the lowest possible level of 
restrictions in 2002, and has remained at the best possible 
standing. 
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Source: Freedom House. The higher the value, the more restrictions there 
are on civil liberties. 
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Interest in political participation was at its highest in 1988. 
Slightly less than 90 percent of eligible Chileans went to the 
polls—a record-breaking turnout. Electoral participation has 
decreased since 1988, with presidential elections attracting 
more voters. Yet, in the most recent presidential election 
(2009) only 62.0 percent of voting-age Chileans voted, the 
lowest since 1970. Decreasing interest in politics might mean 
that people are fully satisfied, but lack of interest may 
correspond to discontent with politics (UNDP 2005). Some 
observers have pointed out a certain malaise with 
democracy, as the political system is insufficiently 
responsive to the demands and needs of citizens (Huneeus 
2003, Navia et al 2008, Morales and Navia 2010). Yet, the 
problem is more nuanced. When measured as percentage of 
registered voters, electoral participation has remained 
remarkably stable and high since 1988. Nine of every ten 
registered voters cast ballots in each of the five presidential 
elections held since 1989 (Navia 2004). Among those 
registered, participation is fairly high.  There are no real 
penalties for those who fail to vote, and a growing number of 
people are not registered. Thus, the electoral participation 
phenomenon has to do with flawed institutional design. 
Voting is mandatory, yet registration is optional. To be 
eligible to vote, one must first register and then is legally 
compelled to vote though penalties are seldom applied to 
those who abstain. Low levels of participation warn that 
democracy may be vulnerable. Lack of participation, 
particularly among youths, hints to future problems of 
legitimacy. When people do not consider electoral 
participation the best mechanism for expressing discontent, 
they will eventually use other means to channel frustration. 
Reforms that foster electoral participation are crucial to the 
future of democracy. 
 
THE LIMITS OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
The arrival of President Michelle Bachelet to office in March 
2006 represented political change. Bachelet, Chile‘s first 
woman president and fourth Concertación president, 
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championed bottom-up democracy. Opposed to the previous 
top-down approaches, she promised to establish participatory 
democracy (gobierno ciudadano). Bachelet focused on 
strengthening the social safety net. In promising to overhaul 
the private pension funds system, Bachelet sought to keep 
the fundamentals of the market-friendly economic model 
first introduced by Pinochet and consolidated under the 
previous Concertación administrations and to introduce 
instruments that would allow the government to play a more 
active role as regulator and foster redistribution (Navia 
2011). Her initiatives included preschool reforms to increase 
coverage and subsidize low-income families, a set of reforms 
to foster more innovation and entrepreneurship in business, 
and improvements in the quality of urban life to ―construct a 
more humane environment and to promote a wider 
conception of human development.‖ (Navia 2011) Although 
the long-term effects of her initiatives are yet to be known, 
Bachelet added a new dimension to the debate on 
consolidating and strengthening democracy. 
 
Source: Author‘s calculation with data from http://www.cepchile.cl. 
 
Politically, Chile faces significant challenges. Recent 
corruption scandals have highlighted the need to better 
regulate campaign finance and make it more transparent. The 
absence of an established system of primaries gives too 
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After coming to power, Chávez convoked a national 
referendum to call for a constitutional assembly. In 1999, 
Venezuelans went to the polls three times. They 
overwhelmingly supported the call for a constitutional 
assembly; 72 percent voted in favor for a new constitution in 
a referendum held in April. Chávez had the enthusiastic 
backing of a significant segment of the excluded population. 
Elections for a constitutional assembly gave Chávez a 
majority in the new assembly and a new constitutional text 
was submitted to a new plebiscite in late 1999.
4
 An 
overwhelming majority approved it and a new constitution 
was adopted. The constitution called for the creation of a 
new republic—following the French Fifth Republic model—
and presidential elections were held in 2000. Chávez won, 
and his allied parties received a majority share of the votes in 
the unicameral Congress.  
 
Since the initial military coup, Chávez showed strong 
sympathy for Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution. 
Similar to the Cuban socialist model, his administration 
began to confiscate foreign companies and nationalize 
certain services and productive sectors, including sectors 
associated with oil production and utilities. His critics 
accused him of moving the country to a socialist-oriented 
economy and concentrating political power (McCoy and 
Myers 2004, Corrales 2006, Hawkins 2010).  
 
In the case of economy, the economic model reforms 
adopted by Chávez correspond to the 1960s development 
corporate state (estado desarrrollista). Chávez believes that 
economic development can be best achieved by having the 
state control the means of production. Thus, he has moved 
forward with an aggressive nationalization effort. Moreover, 
because the state sector is not necessarily well prepared or 
equipped to take on productive activities, Venezuela‘s 
                                                 
4
 ―Venezuelans vote in local elections,‖ 
http://www.nowpublic.com/world/venezuelans-vote-local-elections. 
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much power to party elites in selecting candidates for 
Congress and municipal elections. The electoral system is 
insufficiently competitive and fosters a political duopoly; the 
center-left Concertación and the center-right Alianza equally 
split congressional seats in more than 95 percent of all 
districts (Navia et al 2009). Government services have 
improved and are among the most efficient and accountable 
in the region, but they need to improve if Chile is to be 
comparable to industrialized countries. The successes of the 
past should generate optimism about Chile‘s ability to 
strengthen its democracy; however, there are also some 
reasons for concern. What proved successful in securing and 
consolidating democracy in the 1990s might not work in the 
future. Chile must come up with new reforms to meet the 
challenges of the future. As the country commemorated its 
bicentennial, the successes of its first two decades of post-
authoritarian democracy have generated high expectations 
about what can be done in the future. Moving forward will 
not be easy, nor will it be inevitably successful. Yet, Chile 
today enjoys a strong, vibrant, and consolidated democracy 
more so than ever before in its history.  
 
VENEZUELA: WEAKENING DEMOCRACY UNDER 
CHÁVEZ 
 
While most Latin American countries have made significant 
progress in consolidating and expanding democracy since the 
end of the Cold War, the quality of democracy in Venezuela 
has worsened.2  In the 1970s and 1980s, when authoritarian 
governments ruled throughout Latin America, Venezuela 
was an exception. Together with Costa Rica—and to a lesser 
extent Colombia—Venezuela was civilian ruled, with regular 
free and fair elections and peaceful transfer of power. Since 
the third wave of the democracy (1980s), Venezuela has 
                                                 
2 Other countries have a comparable low quality democracy in the 
region—in addition to authoritarian Cuba, the quality of democracy in 
Nicaragua, Guatemala and Honduras is also low according to many 
international rankings. 
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moved against the international trend.  Modern democracy 
can be traced back to 1958, when the Pérez Jimenez 
dictatorship (1952-1958) came to an end. Pérez Jimenez was 
forced to resign after popular protests followed his decision 
to hold a plebiscite rather than elections in 1957. Eventually, 
a negotiated transition to democracy by the emerging three 
parties, that is, Acción Democrática (AD), the Christian 
Democratic COPEI, and the Unión Republicana 
Democrática (URD), emerged. A pact to secure a transition 
to democracy was reached.  It called for respect for the 
results of democratic elections, creation of a national unity 
government, incorporating members of losing parties into the 
presidential cabinet, and reaching consensus on a policy 
platform were agreed to.  This pact, the Pacto de Punto Fijo, 
sought to discourage the military from seeking power and 
was modeled after the so-called consociational democratic 
model (Arendt Lijphart).  The pact proposed that all relevant 
parties be guaranteed some access to shared power to secure 
compliance and allegiance to the government.  
 
The three leaders of the Pacto—COPEI‘s Rafael Caldera, 
AD‘s Rómulo Betancourt, and URD‘s Jovito Villalba—
enabled democracy to flourish. Betancourt was elected 
president (1959-64). The fact that he had already served as 
president (1945-48) before the dictatorship allowed the old 
political elite to regain control of the state apparatus and to 
secure a peaceful transition to civilian rule. Betancourt‘s 
successor was Raúl Leoni. After his term, Venezuelans 
elected Rafael Caldera, the leader of COPEI. In 1974, AD 
returned to power under Carlos Andrés Pérez (1973-78). 
Pérez represented a generational change, embracing more 
militant leftwing policies. He led an active campaign to 
promote democracy in the region—which made him take 
positions against U.S. anti-communist efforts—and the 
notion that Venezuela‘s oil reserves offered an opportunity 
to reach a much higher level of development. High oil prices 
and political crisis in the Middle East consolidated his 
leadership. He championed the creation of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and advocated for 
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productivity has lagged behind as a result of increased 
participation of the public sector in the economy. Even 
worse, because the government is always subject to political 
pressures to increase social spending, nationalized industrial 
and productive sectors have failed to make the necessary 
investments to remain competitive. The government uses 
public sector revenues to fund social programs rather than 
reinvest to improve productivity. Finally, the lack of 
competition in a public sector-controlled economy has 
created opportunities for corruption. 
 
Politically, Chávez has concentrated power and undermined 
institutions that provide for checks and balances. Repeated 
constitutional reforms have given more power to the central 
government. When the opposition makes electoral gains in 
local elections, the government has responded by reducing 
the powers of local authorities through constitutional 
reforms. Granted, the erratic and divided opposition has 
contributed to its own weakening, and the president has 
shown an enormous ability at winning elections (Corrales 
2006). Although evidence of irregularities and unfair 
practices that favor Chávez and his allies abound (Carter 
Center 2007), it would be excessive to claim that he has 
remained in office against the will of the majority since he 
enjoys significant support among the poor and lower middle 
class (Hawkins et al 2008).  However, even if one accepts his 
electoral strength and acknowledges his victories as 
legitimate, there is unquestionable evidence that Chávez has 
not ruled democratically (Human Rights Watch 2008). He 
has overstepped his powers and attributions and, despite 
ruling with a custom-made constitution, he has also changed 
it several times—and found ways around it—to advance his 
political agenda (Hawkins 2010, Human Rights Watch 
2008).  As Figures 6 and 7 below shows, independent 
observers point to a weakening of democratic values in 
Venezuela. The Freedom House Index has consistently 
shown political rights and civil liberties in Venezuela as 
worsening since Chávez came to power in 1999. Most 
recently, Chávez successfully changed it to be allowed to 
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developing countries having an independent voice during the 
Cold War.  While other countries were experiencing 
breakdowns, Venezuelan democracy was being consolidated, 
and the country was emerging as a leader among developing 
nations. 
 
The election of COPEI‘s Luis Herrera Campins in 1979 
showed that the Pacto had begun to deteriorate.  The power 
sharing between the two main parties,  AD and COPEI, 
(URD had left the Pacto in the early 1960s) had generated a 
class of bureaucrats whose careers depended on party 
allegiance rather than performance. Parties became 
employment agencies for people who wanted to enter the 
public sector. The system became increasingly less 
competitive and prone to corruption. Under AD‘s Jaime 
Lusinchi (1984-89), corruption increased dramatically. The 
negative terms of trade resulting from low oil prices limited 
the government‘s ability to offer social services. Foreign 
debt also became a political and financial problem.  The 
resources produced by oil exports were not efficiently 
distributed among the population and a large underclass was 
excluded from many social services and opportunities. As 
Pacto governments had sought to create and consolidate a 
strong middle class, the focus being on establishing subsidies 
that mostly benefited the middle class—such as free access 
to higher education or oil subsidies for automobile owners—
there were insufficient subsidies and job-creating stimulus 
programs to help bring people out of poverty. Migration 
from the country-side to cities worsened urban poverty. In 
short, the Pacto became a victim of its own success by 
creating a stable and pampered middle class with abundant 
resources from oil export. Many members of the excluded 
rural population and urban poor began to express 
dissatisfaction with the system and demanded more 
inclusion. Because electoral democracy was consolidated 
and electoral results were widely respected, the excluded 
majority had an opportunity to make its voice heard.  
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Carlos Andrés Pérez returned to the presidency in 1989. 
Despite having campaigned against Washington Consensus 
policies to cut spending, Pérez quickly signed an agreement 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) accepting many 
of the Consensus policy recommendations.
3
 A drastic 
increase in public transportation triggered a protest 
movement known as Caracazo in February 1989. The social 
peace associated with the Pacto could no longer be 
guaranteed. Riots against the government underlined the 
exclusion that had come to characterize society since the 
mid-1980s.  Discontent with the Pérez administration—and 
political elites in general—led to the unpopularity of the 
Pacto and fueled calls for drastic change. Hugo Chávez‘ 
failed military coup attempt reflected dissatisfaction with the 
elite, and he became a hero for many of the poor who had 
not benefited and were now suffering from austerity policies 
adopted by Pérez. 
 
In the 1998 presidential campaign, the main candidates all 
disavowed the Pacto and promised radical reforms. Hugo 
Chávez won the election with 56.2 percent of the vote. The 
candidate of the COPEI and AD received 2.8 percent of the 
vote. Rather than correct the ills of the Pacto, Chávez 
replaced democratic institutions with institutions that 
concentrated power in his own hands. Moreover, even 
though he did promise to bring an end to corrupt government 
practices, recent evidence shows that the rule of law 
continues to be characterized by discretionary decisions on 
the part of government, and corruption indicators remain 
high (Corrales 2006, McCoy and Myers 2004).  
                                                 
3
 In 1990, John Williamson coined the term ―Washington Consensus‖ to 
refer to the set of economic reforms that the U.S. government and 
Washington-based international-financial institutions had considered 
necessary to restore growth in Latin America during the late 1980s. 
Williamson summarized these recommendations as a combination of 
―prudent macroeconomic policies, outward orientation, and free-market 
capitalism.‖  Read more: http://www.answers.com/topic/washington-
consensus#ixzz1FegNxxLc. 
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seek indefinite re-election. He is expected to run again when 
his second term expires in 2012.  
 
Many critics consider Chávez a populist. The term has 
different meanings. For some, it refers to adopting 
expansionary economic policies that ultimately lead to fiscal 
deficits and runaway inflation. For others, populism refers to 
a style of leadership that seeks to bypass political parties and 
institutions and create a direct link of unmediated 
communication with the masses. Others define populism as a 
democratic practice that seeks to concentrate power in the 
hands of a personalistic leader, undermining democratic 
institutions (Castañeda and Navia 2006). Depending on the 
definition used, different regional leaders have been labeled 
populist. For example, former Argentine President Raúl 
Alfonsín was considered a populist on economic grounds. 
His successor, Carlos Menem, who championed neo-liberal 
reforms, was labeled a populist based on his governance 
style. Former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe was also 
deemed populist because of his personal style and, according 
to some critics, his effort to concentrate power in his own 
hands and his failed attempt to stay in power beyond the end 
of his second term (Castañeda and Navia 2006, Dugas 2003). 
President Chávez can be classified as a populist because he 
has adopted economic policies that are typical of 1940s and 
1950‘s state-led economic growth experiences. He has also 
developed a highly personalistic style. His weekly television 
programs, where he makes policy decisions and shows 
disregard for democratic institutions by acting as a 
benevolent authority figure that allegedly defends the 
interests of the poor, have become a symbol of his leadership 
style. Chávez regularly surprises people with his unexpected, 
and occasionally improvised, announcements of policy 
reforms, nationalization initiatives, and even foreign policy 
decisions.  
 
Independent observers have also noted a worsening of the 
conditions under which democracy functions in the country. 
Freedom House has ranked Venezuela as a country where 
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restrictions on political and civil liberties have increased in 
recent years. Venezuela had fewer restrictions on freedom 
during much of the 1970s and 1980s, when many other 
countries where ruled by authoritarian governments. Since 
the transition to democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
restrictions on civil and political liberties have decreased. 
Unfortunately, Venezuela has gone in the opposite direction. 
Since the late 1990s restrictions on civil and political 
liberties have increased. In the last 10 years, Venezuela has 
had more restrictions on political and civil liberties than the 
regional average. Thus, as democracy has consolidated in the 
region, the quality of democracy—measured in civil and 
political liberties—has worsened in Venezuela.  
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Source: Freedom House. The higher the value, the more restrictions there 
are on civil liberties. 
 
During his 12 years in power, Chávez has implemented 
economic policies that have not been conducive to sustained 
economic growth. Despite the generally positive terms of 
trade for the Venezuelan economy—especially the high oil 
prices—economic development has been at best modest. 
Analyzing Latin America and Venezuela‘s GDP growth 
from 1960 to 2010, Venezuela did worse than the regional 
average for most of the Pacto years. In the late 1980s and 
1990s Venezuela showed the typical pro-cyclical pattern, 
growing faster than the region in good years and suffering 
from recessions when regional economies experienced 
setbacks. That pro-cyclical pattern has accentuated since 
Chávez came into office in 1999. In years where the regional 
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economy has expanded, Venezuela‘s economy has grown 
even faster; however, when the economy has slowed down, 
Venezuela has experienced years of significant recessions. 
This pro-cyclical pattern reflects the economic policies 
championed by the Chávez administration, with expansion of 
government spending in the years the economy grows and 
spending reductions when economic activity slows down. 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
Chavez has seen his approval ratings fluctuate significantly 
in the last 10 years. During periods of economic crisis and 
political tensions, his approval rating has fallen below 30 
percent. In 2002 he suffered a coup attempt. The coup 
attempt was a defining moment; afterwards, he developed 
stronger anti-American and anti-business positions, accusing 
the U.S. and big business of supporting the coup. In 2003 
PDVSA workers went on strike; almost 20 thousand workers 
were fired, and Chávez acquired control of the largest 
company and employer in the country (Hawkins 2010). In 
2004 a recall referendum was opposed by the government, 
but Chávez won the recall election, further weakening the 
opposition. In 2005, the opposition opted to boycott 
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legislative elections, and then participated in the 2006 
election but lost (Hawkins 2010). In the 2010 legislative 
election, the opposition did fairly well, but gerrymandering 
provisions allowed Chávez to retain a sufficiently large 
representation in the legislature, which granted him the 
power to govern via decree for a good part of 2011, 
preventing opposition interference (Romero 2010).  Chávez‘ 
popularity has declined in recent years, mostly due to 
economic conditions, increasing crime rates, and the 
perception that the government is tolerant of corruption and 
inefficient in the provision of social services.  
 
Source: Data from Observatorio Electoral Universidad Diego Portales, 
Chile 
  
DIFFERENT RESULTS IN VENEZUELA AND CHILE 
 
Since the late 1980s, Venezuela and Chile have experienced 
dramatically different patterns of economic and democratic 
development. Chilean democracy has been consolidated and 
strengthened, while Venezuelan democracy has deteriorated, 
with the political class increasingly polarized and 
government centralizing power.  After 12 years in office, 
Chávez has presided over a democratic system that is much 
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weaker than it was when he came into office. As democratic 
institutions have consolidated in Chile, in Venezuela we 
have observed a pattern of institutional weakening and the 
replacing of checks-and-balances provisions with an 
institutional structure that concentrates power in the hands of 
the executive. 
 
Source: Author‘s with data from World Development Indicators, World 
Bank, 2010. 
 
Figure 10 shows poverty levels in Venezuela and Chile. 
Using the World Bank standard indicator of the percentage 
of people living below US$2 per day, Chile has made more 
progress in reducing poverty since the late 1980s. In fact, 
less than 4 percent of Chileans live below poverty today. The 
percentage of Venezuelans living below poverty has 
fluctuated dramatically in the last 20 years, reaching a 
maximum of 30 percent in 2003 and a minimum of 9 percent 
in 1989. In recent years, and as a result of high oil prices, the 
percentage of Venezuelans living in poverty has decreased. 
Yet, the level of poverty is mostly explained by the price of 
oil—and the corresponding ability of the government to 
provide social services to the poor—rather than stable 
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economic growth. When the economic cycles turns 
unfavorable to Venezuelan exports, the number of 
Venezuelans who live below poverty will increase again. 
  
Source: Author‘s and World Bank Development Indicators (2010) of % 
of people living under $2 per day.  
 
Figure 11 shows the GDP per capita evolution in Venezuela 
and Chile since 1980. There are two notable observations. 
First, in real terms, Venezuela‘s economy is actually worse 
now than it was in the 1980s. Controlling for inflation, the 
per capita GDP of Venezuela is lower today than in 2010. In 
contrast, Chile‘s per capita GDP almost tripled in the same 
time period. In 1998, Chile‘s per capita GDP surpassed that 
of Venezuela. Since then, the Chilean economy has 
continued to grow steadily while the Venezuelan economy 
has suffered fluctuations. Figure 11 shows data up to 2009, 
with both countries suffering setbacks in their per capita 
GDP as a result of the 2008 international economic crisis. 
Since then, the Chilean economy has grown again (5 percent 
in 2010) while the Venezuelan economy shrunk by -1.3 
percent in 2010. 
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Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. *GDP per capita, 
PPP (constant 2005 international $) 
 
The divergent pattern of democratic consolidation and 
economic development experienced by Chile and Venezuela 
since the late 1990 is especially notorious. Both countries are 
subject to similar shocks produced by the international 
economic cycle. As Venezuela exports oil and Chile exports 
copper, both countries benefit when commodity prices 
increase.  Thus, one would expect the economic cycle in 
Chile and Venezuela to be similar. Yet, the political 
evolution of both countries has been markedly different.  
That has resulted in different economic policies implemented 
by their respective governments, with Chile experiencing 
better results in terms of GDP growth and poverty reductions 
than Venezuela.   
 
The most striking difference in the political evolution of both 
countries has to do with the balance between individual 
leadership and institutional strength. While Chile has 
consolidated a democracy of institutions, where individual 
leaders are regularly replaced by other democratically 
elected authorities, Venezuela has seen its democracy evolve 
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around the controversial leadership of Hugo Chávez. 
Regardless of the validity of the accusations against him of 
being an authoritarian leader or increasingly less democratic, 
the fact of the matter is that Chávez has unquestionably 
remained as the most important figure in Venezuelan 
politics. In Chile, institutions have consolidated beyond 
individual leaders. Presidents have come and gone, but the 
political process has remained firmly in place. That, in and 
of itself, constitutes a dramatic contrast with the evolution of 
politics in Venezuela.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While Chile was able to build and consolidate democracy 
after a painful and divisive authoritarian period, Venezuela 
has seen its democracy deteriorate. Chile today is more 
democratic and has stronger institutions than it did in 1990. 
Conversely, Venezuela has seen its democratic institutions 
weaken since the end of the Cold War. In Chile, democracy 
has been consolidated and poverty reduced. In the late 1980s, 
Venezuela had a higher GDP per capita than Chile and fewer 
people living under the poverty line. Twenty years later, 
Chile has developed more than Venezuela. In Venezuela 
poverty has fluctuated depending on the price of its most 
important export commodity, oil. Although positive, Chilean 
democracy has some flaws that need to be addressed. The 
political system is insufficiently competitive, with the 
number of those choosing not to participate in the political 
process increasing. Moreover, despite sustained economic 
growth and reductions in poverty, high inequality remains an 
issue and threatens long-term stability. Venezuela was 
considered a stable democracy—with high levels of income 
inequality in the 1970s. Chile seems to be doing much more 
to address challenges than Venezuela did in the 1970s. While 
Chileans can look forward to a future with a stronger and 
more consolidated democracy, with accompanying economic 
development, Venezuela will need to change its roadmap to 
find a sustainable path to economic development and 
democratic consolidation. Chileans have consistently voted 
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for continuity in economic policies and social policies, and 
have peacefully experienced the transfer of power from a 
center-left to a center-right government, while Venezuelans 
cannot be certain that the 2012 presidential elections will be 
free, fair, and involve all parties and express the popular will. 
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